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Community Property and 
Family Law 
by Arthur M. Sammis* 
Probably the most important development in the field of 
community property law during the past year was the legis-
lation affecting causes of action and damages for injury to 
the person. Several cases dealing with integrated property 
settlements are of importance in clarifying problems relating 
to support provisions, modification, and enforcement. De-
velopments in the case and statutory law dealing with the 
parent and child relation have emphasized the continuing trend 
toward liberality in the legitimation of children. Three major 
areas in this field have received attention and are worthy of 
comment. The conclusive presumption of legitimacy set forth 
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in Evidence Code section 621 has been further strengthened 
by judicial decision; two new cases and one new statute are of 
importance in dealing with the problems of legitimation and 
adoption, and there has been some clarification of the judicial 
attitude toward artificial insemination and the numerous prob-
lems it presents. 
Causes of Action and Damages for Injury to the Person 
Prior to the enactment of Civil Code section 163.51 in 1957, 
the California cases were uniform in holding the cause of 
action for personal injuries, if arising during the marriage, to 
be presumptively community property, and the damages which 
it produced to have the same character.2 The presumption 
could be overcome by showing an agreement between the 
spouses controlling the classification of the cause of action,3 
or by showing it arose when the property rights of the spouse 
were within the coverage of section 169 of the Civil Code.4 
In addition, after acquisition of the cause of action its char-
acter could be changed by contract,5 and the community 
classification of the action for damages for personal injury 
automatically ended on termination of the community by death 
or by divorce. 6 The primary difficulty with this concept of the 
cause of action for personal injuries as community property 
was its effect in cases involving contributory negligence by one 
of the spouses. When the injured spouse was the wife, the 
courts held that the community character of the action per-
mitted the conduct of the husband, to the extent that it was the 
1. Cal. Stats. 1957, Ch. 2334, pro-
viding: "All damages, special and gen-
eral, awarded a married person in a 
civil action for personal injuries, are 
the separate property of such married 
person." 
2. Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622, 
248 P.2d 922 (1952); Zaragosa v. 
Craven, 33 Ca1.2d 315, 202 P.2d 73, 6 
A.L.R.2d 461 (1949). 
3. Perkins v. Sunset Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 155 Cal. 712, 103 P. 
190 (1909). 
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4. Christiana v. Rose, 100 Cal. App. 
2d 46, 222 P.2d 89 I (1950). 
5. There is nothing in Kesler v. 
Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254, 273 P.2d 257 
(1954) in conflict with this. See Perkins 
v. Sunset Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
155 Cal. 712, 103 P. 190 (1909) and 
Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal.2d 315, 202 
P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R.2d 461 (1949). 
6. Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622, 
248 P.2d 922 (1952); Washington v. 
Washington, 47 Cal.2d 249, 302 P.2d 
569 (1956). 
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type of conduct constituting a defense to the cause of action, to 
be imputed to the wife. 7 
The reason underlying the imputation of the husband's con-
duct to the wife was the necessity of eliminating the possibility 
that he would benefit from his own wrongful conduct since he 
would have a community property interest in the damages re-
covered. The same rule and the same reason applied where 
the injured party was the husband and the contributorily negli-
gent spouse the wife, at least after 1927, when the interests of 
both husband and wife were defined as "present, existing, and 
equal."g Although the parties could contract between them-
selves as to the nature of the cause of action, such a contract, 
when entered into after the cause of action arose, was in-
sufficient to prevent the imputation of contributory negligence 
where that defense existed.9 
Coincident with the enactment of Civil Code section 163.5 
the legislature in 1957 directed the Law Revision Commission 
to undertake a study "to determine whether an award of dam-
ages made to a married person in a personal injury action 
should be the separate property of such married person." The 
report and recommendation of the commission,IO which re-
sulted in the 1968 legislation, points out quite clearly the 
undesirable side effects of the provision that damages awarded 
to a married person for personal injuries are separate property; 
although the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence 
based upon the community character of the damages recovered 
was effectively abrogated, the cure was, in many respects, 
far more dangerous than the disease. Obviously, the classi-
fication of "all damages, special and general," as the separate 
property of the injured spouse went far beyond the situation 
involving contributory negligence on the part of the other 
spouse. Consider the case of the husband who recovers sub-
stantial damages against a negligent defendant for injuries 
7. Contributory negligence, see Mc- 8. Cal. Civ. Code § 161a, Stats. 1927, 
Fadden v. Santa Ana, Orange & Tustin Ch. 265. 
St. Ry. Co., 87 Cal. 464, 25 P. 681 9. Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Ca1.2d 254, 
(1891), and a long line of cases culmi- 273 P.2d 257 (1954). 
nating in Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254, 10. Cal. L. Rev. Com. Rpts., Recom. 
273 P.2d 257 (1954). & Stud. 1966-67. pp. 1389-1402. 
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suffered in an accident in which the wife was in no way in-
volved. Substantial medical expenses may have been incurred 
and compensated for in the award of special damages; if com-
munity funds were expended in payment of such expenses the 
recovery nevertheless remained the separate property of the 
husband and the community was not entitled to reimburse-
ment. The earning capacity of the husband may have been 
gravely impaired, not only during the period of hospitalization 
but also in the future, and this is a major item in the award of 
general damages. Although the earnings of the husband 
(and his ability to earn) are a community asset, the damages 
remained the separate property of the husband and the com-
munity had no interest therein. If they are the separate prop-
erty of the husband, damages received for personal injuries are 
subject to his unrestricted disposition either by inter vivos gift 
or by way of testamentary act, and if he dies intestate the 
share of the surviving spouse will not usually exceed one-half 
and may be reduced to as little as one-third, as contrasted with 
the right to inherit the whole of the community property. If 
the husband, recognizing the inequities of the situation, de-
cides to convert his separate property recovery into com-
munity property, both state and federal gift tax consequences 
arise; if he retains the recovery as his separate property it 
receives less favorable treatment at the time of his death. 
The Law Revision Commission recommended a return to 
the earlier law and the enactment of legislation again making 
damages received by a married person for personal injuries 
resulting from the conduct of a third party community prop-
erty. It recognized certain inherent defects (in addition to 
the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence) in the pre-
1957 law and suggested legislation to deal with them. It 
proposed further that the original ailment, which produced 
the drastic cure of Civil Code section 163.5, be dealt with 
by providing that the negligence of one spouse does not bar 
recovery by the other unless such concurring negligence would 
be a defense if the marriage did not exist. (It is difficult 
to understand why this simple remedy did not occur to the 
legislators 'in 1957.) 
350 CAL LAW 1969 
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The commission's recommendation was accompanied by a 
draft of the proposed legislation. New measures were pro-
posed: first, an act to amend sections 146, 163.5 and 171a 
of, and to add sections 164.6, 164.7, and 169.3 to, the 
Civil Code, relating to married persons, including their com-
munity property and tort liability; second, a measure amend-
ing section 171 c of the Civil Code. The recommendation 
was accepted and the legislation adopted as a package, with 
the addition of an amendment to section 168 of the Civil Code 
making community property personal injury damages subject 
to the payment of debts contracted by either husband or wife 
for the necessities of life furnished to them or either of 
them while living together. ll 
Effects of the New Legislation 
(1) Civil Code section 163.5 has been amended so that 
personal injury damages paid to a married person are separate 
property only if they are paid by the other spouse. One of 
the effects of section 163.5 as previously enacted was to elim-
inate the doctrine of interspousal immunity for personal torts;12 
the liability of either spouse for personal torts, intentional 
or negligent, causing injury to the other spouse is preserved 
by the amendment, and the recovery is separate property of 
the injured spouse. In all other cases the original rule applies 
since the character of such damages as community property 
is determined by section 164 of the Civil Code. 
(2) The new Civil Code section 164.6 deals specifically 
with the imputed contributory negligence problem. The old 
rule, imputing contributory negligence from one spouse to 
the other on the theory of the negligent spouse's participation 
in the recovery as community property, is eliminated by pro-
viding directly that the negligence or wrongdoing of the other 
spouse is not a defense in an action against a third party by 
the injured spouse except in cases where such negligence or 
wrongdoing would be a defense if the marriage did not exist. 
11. Cal. Stats. 1968, Chs. 457, 458, Cal. Rptr. 97, 376 P.2d 65 (1962); 
pp. 128-133. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d 692, 26 Cal. 
12. Self v. Self, 58 Ca1.2d 683, 26 Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962). 
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(3) The new Civil Code section 164.7 deals with the 
recovery of damages by one spouse for injury suffered through 
the negligence, or wrongful act or omission to act, of the 
other spouse and provides that community property may not 
be used to discharge the liability of the tortfeasor spouse to 
the other spouse until the separate property of the tortfeasor 
spouse has been exhausted. The right of the parties to agree 
to the use of community property in such a case is limited 
to agreements entered into after the occurrence of the injury, 
and subsection (c) reserves the right of the tortfeasor spouse 
to rely on insurance liability policies which he may have even 
though the premiums thereon may have been paid with com-
munity funds. 
(4) Subsection (a) of the new Civil Code section 169.3 
treats recovery for personal injuries to a married person in 
the same manner that earnings and accumulations are treated 
under Civil Code sections 169, 169.1, 169.2 and 175 and 
makes it clear that such recovery is the separate property 
of the injured spouse if it is received under the circumstances 
paralleling those in the other sections. Subdivision (b) pro-
vides for a right of reimbursement in the event that the spouse 
of the injured person has paid expenses incurred by reason 
of the injury out of either separate property or community 
property under his management and control. 
(5) The amendment to section 171 a of the Civil Code 
clarifies the liability of each of the spouses for injury or 
damage caused by the other and limits recovery to the sepa-
rate property of the spouse incurring the liability and to the 
community property under his or her management and con-
trol. The most important effect of this amendment is the 
clarification of the law relating to liability for torts of the 
wife. 
(6) The amendment to Civil Code section 171 c again 
places under the control and management of the wife dam-
ages received as community property by her for personal 
InJurIes. The language of the amendment, substituting the 
phrase "community personal property" for the former word 
"money," eliminates the uncertainty which previously existed 
352 CAL LAW 1969 
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concerning the nature of earnings and damages not received 
in cash. It also makes it plain that the wife can control 
earned wealth originally acquired as "money" and items pur-
chased or earned by such wealth until it ceases to be a sepa-
rately manageable item of community property. The husband 
is given a right to use community property received as damages 
to pay for expenses incurred by reason of the wife's personal 
injuries, or to reimburse his separate property or the commu-
nity property under his management and control in the event 
that it has been necessary for him to advance payment from 
such sources. 
(7) As previously pointed out the amendment to section 
168 of the Civil Code provides for the inclusion of community 
property personal injury damages of the wife and the treat-
ment of such damages in the same manner as earnings insofar 
as liability for necessities is concerned. 
(8) Certainly the greatest innovation embodied in the 
1968 legislation is the special provision contained in the 
amendment to Civil Code section 146, concerning the divi-
sion of property received as personal injury damages on di-
vorce or separate maintenance. Up to this point the statutory 
"package" merely reinstates the concept of damages for per-
sonal injuries as community in character, eliminates the rule 
imputing contributory negligence based solely on the nature 
of the recovery, and makes certain corrective changes dealing 
with the management of such recovery. As previously men-
tioned, in most cases the primary item of general damages 
is the impaired earning capacity or loss of earnings of the 
injured spouse. Obviously, if a divorce action is brought 
shortly after the damages are recovered and they are treated 
as regular community property and apportioned between the 
parties, a substantial portion of the award may represent 
the loss of earnings which would be received after the judg-
ment of divorce or separate maintenance. The section as it 
now stands provides that without regard to the ground on 
which the decree is rendered or to which party the divorce 
or separate maintenance is granted, community property per-
sonal injury damages shall be assigned to the party who suf-
23 CAL. L.AW 1969 353 
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fered the injuries unless the court, after taking into considera-
tion the economic needs of each party, the time that has 
elapsed since the recovery of the damages, and all other facts 
of the case, determines that the interests of justice require 
another disposition. If the court so decides, it may assign 
the community property personal injury damages to the parties 
in such proportions as the court deems just under the facts 
of the particular case. This creates a completely new form 
of community property to be dealt with at the time of divorce 
or the granting of a decree of separate maintenance, and 
sets up a very different rule for its award than is applicable 
in the case of the normal community property or quasi-com-
munity property. While this may raise a constitutional prob-
lem, it would seem that the unique nature of such property, 
having as its source the compensation for injuries to one of 
the spouses, is sufficient to sustain its separate classification. 
Summary. The new legislation dealing with recovery for 
personal injuries returned the status of such recovery to that 
of community property, eliminated the doctrine of imputed 
contributory negligence to the extent that the doctrine has 
been predicated solely upon the community character of the 
damages recovered, clarified the right of management and 
control of property so received and its liability for debts 
of the parties, and created a separate category for the treat-
ment of such property upon divorce or separate maintenance. 
The changes were badly needed and apparently have solved 
the problems existing before 1957 as well as those created 
by the enactment of Civil Code section 163.5 without creating 
any serious difficulties. This does not mean that the problems 
of the past have vanished; with the exception of the amend-
ments to sections 168 and 171 c of the Civil Code (which 
amendments apply only to "community property personal in-
jury damages") all the provisions of the new legislation are 
subject to the savings clause which provides that: "(t)his 
act does not confer or impair any right or defense arising 
out of any death or injury to personal property occurring 
prior to the effective date of this act." Damages received 
for personal injuries during the past eleven years are, to the 
354 CAL LAW 1969 
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extent that their character has not been changed by co-mingling 
with community property or by agreement, the separate prop-
erty of the spouse who received them. Further, causes of 
action which arose before the effective date of the new legis-
lation, but which have not yet been tried or settled, will result 
in the acquisition by the injured party of an award which 
is his or her separate property. Having once opened Pandora's 
box, the evils which were released are not returned to con-
finement merely by closing the lid. 
Integrated Property Settlements-Support Provisions; Modifi-
cations and Enforcement 
The background of the law pertaining to integrated prop-
erty settlement agreements, the modification and enforcement 
of support provisions contained in such agreements, and the 
1967 amendments to Civil Code section 139 have been pre-
viously discussed.13 No cases under the 1967 law have as yet 
reached the point of decision in the appellate courts, but 
several recent cases under the old law deserve attention. 
In Hecht v. Hecht14 and in Tremayne v. Striepeke/6 the 
court was concerned with the question of whether the provi-
sions contained in an integrated property settlement agreement 
were "support" provisions within the meaning of Civil Code 
section 139. In both cases the agreements were entered into 
during the period covered by the 1961 amendment to Civil 
Code section 139, providing for the modification of provi-
sions for support of the spouse contained in an integrated 
property settlement agreement where there were minor chil-
dren of the parties. 
The agreement in Hecht was executed as of April 24, 1963, 
and the agreement in Tremayne was executed on December 
21,1961; in both cases there were minor children. In Hecht 
the parties were unable to consummate a property settlement 
during the pendency of the divorce action. They entered 
13. See Cal Law Trends and De- 15. 262 Cal. App.2d 107, 68 Cal. 
velopments 1967, pages 113-117. Rptr. 470 (1968). 
14. 259 Cal. App.2d 1, 67 Cal. Rptr. 
293 (1968). 
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into a stipulation for support of the children, of the wife, 
and otherwise effecting but not completing a disposition of 
their property rights. Thereafter, an interlocutory decree of 
divorce was granted to the wife which, among other things, 
reserved to the court for its determination the issues of ali-
mony, child support, and division of community property. 
Final judgment of divorce was entered on August 31, 1962. 
The wife remarried in September, 1962, and the husband re-
married in October of that year. A property settlement agree-
ment was finally executed April 24, 1963, and this settlement 
was incorporated in haec verba into an order of the court 
dated June 28, 1963. The agreement (and the court order) 
provided for "alimony payments," and stated that such pay-
ments should not be modifiable by either party or the court, 
that they should terminate only upon expiration of 121 months 
from May 1, 1963, or upon the death of the wife, and that 
they should not terminate upon the death of the husband or 
upon remarriage of the wife. Further provision was made 
for the payments to constitute a charge against the estate 
of the husband if he pre-deceased his former wife within the 
l2l-month period. The agreement was expressly stated to be 
an integrated one, and both parties conceded that it was one 
in fact. 
The court, in deciding that this was not a provision for 
"support" within the meaning of Civil Code section 139, 
pointed out that alimony or support provisions for a wife 
were not usually made in a settlement executed after the 
wife has remarried. After discussing the general rules pertain-
ing to alimony and support payments as arising primarily 
from the marital relationship, and after pointing out that 
one of the inherent characteristics of alimony is that it is 
paid during a period in which a divorced wife remains un-
married and that payment thereof ordinarily terminates on 
the death of either spouse, the court went on to state the 
well-settled rule that when installment payments have been 
made an integrated part of a settlement, although such pay-
ments may have been designated as alimony or support pay-
ments, they are nevertheless not alimony to the extent that 
they represent a division of the community property itself, 
356 CAL LAW 1969 
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or constitute an inseparable part of the considerations of the 
property settlement. The court then held that the payments, 
provided to be paid under the terms of the agreement and 
under the decree, were a contribution to division of property 
rather than a substitute for marital support and that they 
were therefore outside the scope of Civil Code section 139 
as amended. 
The court in the Tremayne case relied heavily upon Hecht. 
In the latter case the parties had entered into a property 
settlement agreement prior to divorce which contained provi-
sions for support of the children, a division of the community 
property and support of the wife. By virtue of the provisions 
for support of the wife the husband committed himself to make 
payments of $200 monthly (in two installments) which, as 
the agreement expressly provided, "shall continue during the 
joint lives of husband and wife and until wife shall remarry, 
or they shall cease on the death of husband or on the death 
or remarriage of wife." The interlocutory decree adopted 
these provisions and the final decree made binding any and 
all provisions in the interlocutory judgment. More than four 
months after the entry of the final decree the parties entered 
into a supplement to the original agreement which provided 
that the payment of alimony should terminate 10 years and 
30 days after the execution of the supplement, and that the 
supplement as well as the original statement be deemed inte-
grated and non-modifiable except by written agreement of the 
parties or upon order of the court. One month later the 
court made its order modifying the interlocutory and final 
decrees and ordered the husband to pay the specified support 
sums for the period stated in the supplement. Thereafter the 
wife remarried and the husband ceased making support pay-
ments. The court concluded that these payments were not 
"support" payments within the meaning of Civil Code section 
139. 
That there is a fundamental distinction between installment 
payments, made directly as a part of the property division, 
and provisions for support contained in an integrated prop-
erty settlement agreement, which constitute an integral part 
CAL LAW 1969 357 
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of the consideration for the property settlement as a whole, 
does not appear to have occurred to the court in Hecht. Obvi-
ously, if the obligation is of the first kind there is no integrated 
agreement; the contract simply relates to the division of prop-
erty and nothing more. Language in the Tremayne decision 
indicates that the court may have really regarded the purported 
support provisions as payments to be made as part of a non-
integrated agreement for division of property, despite the 
express language stating the agreement to be an integrated one. 
The court discusses the case of Hilton v. McNitt/6 with partic-
ular reference to the second decision in that case,I7 holding 
that an ambiguous provision relating to payments for "sup-
port" was in fact a payment in lieu of property. If the provi-
sions in Hecht and in Tremayne were ambiguous the decisions 
would be justifiable. But it is difficult to ascertain whether 
the courts in both cases were simply unaware of the nature 
of an integrated property settlement agreement or decided 
to narrow the application of Civil Code section 139 despite 
the express language of the statute. 
Another example of judicial gymnastics appears in Garrett 
v. Garrett. IS The case also points up an adage well known 
to the legal profession: "Never act as your own attorney 
unless you want a fool for a client." The combination of the 
two has resulted in a decision completely sound in its ultimate 
result but absolutely weird in the path that was followed 
to reach the decision, both by the court and by the unfortunate 
defendant, who was also a respected member of the bar. The 
problems inherent in the case were enhanced by the counsel 
for plaintifi' wife who ultimately testified that he had advised 
the court at the divorce hearing that the parties had entered 
into a property settlement agreement but did not give the 
agreement to the court to inspect because he wished the court 
to retain jurisdiction to enforce by contempt the support 
provisions. 
The facts of the case are simple and the conduct of the 
16. 49 Cal.2d 79, 315 P.2d 1 (1957). 18. 258 Cal. App.2d 407, 65 Cal. 
17. 200 Cal. App.2d 879, 19 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1968). 
Rptr. 688 (1962). 
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parties in relation thereto might also be characterized by the 
same term. They entered into an agreement which (as the 
court properly found) was clearly integrated. The agree-
ment contained a provision for payment of support for the 
children and for the support of the wife until her death or 
remarriage. The interlocutory decree of divorce contained 
precisely the same provisions as did the property settlement 
agreement concerning child custody, child support, and sup-
port for the plaintiff wife, except that the agreement character-
ized the latter payments as "support and maintenance" where-
as the decree called for "alimony and support." The defend-
ant agreed to permit the matter to go by default and did not 
appear at the trial. The final judgment of divorce entered 
in 1955 incorporated the provisions of the interlocutory decree 
by reference, and in April of 1964 the court ordered the 
former husband to show cause why he should not be adjudged 
guilty of contempt for non-compliance with the alimony and 
child support provisions of the interlocutory decree and the 
final decree of divorce. The court did not hold him in con-
tempt but ordered payment of substantial arrearages, attor-
neys' fees and nominal costs. 
On appeal, the court confirmed the integrated nature of the 
agreement and also held that there was no merger of the 
property settlement agreement into the judgment of divorce. 
In view of the fact that the trial judge had not even seen the 
agreement, that it was not incorporated into the decree ex-
pressly or by reference, and that the decree did not purport 
to order performance of the terms of the agreement, the 
finding as to lack of merger is not only logical but indisput-
able. In discussing the jurisdiction of the court to determine 
arrearages, reference is made to Bradley v. Superior Court,19 
where it was held that contempt is not available as a remedy 
to enforce either the wife or child support provisions of an 
integrated property settlement agreement incorporated in the 
divorce decree. Since the trial court in this case had not 
imposed contempt, the relevance of the statement is somewhat 
19. 48 Ca1.2d 509, 310 P.2d 634 
(1957). 
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dubious. But even more amazing is the statement which 
follows it, to wit: "( t) he principle of the Bradley case is 
not restricted to situations where the property settlement agree-
ment has been merged or incorporated into the decree of 
divorce, but applies where the issue of the validity of the 
agreement has been previously presented to the divorce court." 
If the decree of the court has not been substituted for the 
agreement of the parties by way of merger it is somewhat 
difficult to determine where the Bradley principle comes into 
play. Subsequent language of the court in discussing the 
general rules relating to the effect of judicial approval as 
rendering the validity of the agreement res judicata is not 
particularly helpful, although clearly correct. Nor does the 
further discussion of the obvious fact that the trial court was 
not empowered to modify or reject, without the consent or 
acquiescence of the husband, the provisions for the support 
of the wife contained in the integrated agreement shed much 
light on the problem. However, at this point the defendant 
comes to the rescue of the court and of the case; unfortunately, 
his assistance was of benefit to everyone but himself. On 
the face of the decree, over the signature of the defendant 
husband, appeared the following statement: "Agreed to and 
approved both as to form and contents." As pointed out 
by the court, this statement was apparently signed prior to 
the divorce hearing, and it was clear that the defendant in-
tended that the support provisions be adopted by the court 
notwithstanding the provisions of the integrated property settle-
ment agreement. Accordingly, such payments were no longer 
an integral part of the adjustment of property rights but were 
severable, and the order of the court was not based upon an 
integrated property settlement agreement whose provisions 
were inseparably related to the provisions for division of prop-
erty. For those who enjoy Alfred Hitchcock's stories, this 
decision is recommended for late evening reading. 
In the case of Davis v. Davis20 the supreme court was 
confronted with the question, as a matter of first impression, 
20. 68 Cal.2d 290, 66 Cal. Rptr. 14, 
437 P.2d 502 (1968). 
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whether after the remarriage to each other of divorced parents 
either may enforce against the other an order for child sup-
port made in a prior divorce proceeding. The peripatetic 
nature of the husband's employment created problems; at 
the time of the first divorce no order was made for support 
of the children as the defendant had been served outside of 
California by publication; subsequently, pursuant to the stipu-
lation of the parties, an order for child support was made. 
Thereafter the parties remarried each other and several months 
later again separated. Plaintiff wife instituted a second di-
vorce action in California but, since the defendant was then 
employed in the oil fields in Iran, he was again served by 
publication and again the divorce decree did not provide 
support payments for the children. Upon his return to Cali-
fornia the parties again stipulated that a court order could 
be made for child support, and a second order was duly 
made. The defendant complied with this order. The mother 
then sought to collect child support payments for some 36 
months between the separation that followed the remarriage 
and the second support order and relied upon the support 
order entered in the first divorce action. 
Could she recover? No. If the parties again intermarry 
child custody and support orders as between themselves are 
thereupon terminated, as is the jurisdiction of the court to 
enforce such orders. This is true whether or not the parents 
subsequently divorce again. The incidence of remarriage 
of divorced couples is low enough in itself, but when there 
is added to it the time lag here involved it seems doubtful that 
many cases will require the application of the rule laid down 
in Davis. 
May a person ordered to make support payments be held 
in contempt when he does not make them because he does 
nov have the ability to make the payment in full but is capable 
of paying a lesser amount? Yes, said the supreme court, in 
Lyon v. Superior Court,I sustaining the lower court and 
reversing the district court of appeal. The reason? After 
1. 68 Ca1.2d 446, 67 Cal. Rptr. 265, cussion of this case, see YORK, REM-
439 P.2d 1 (1968). For further dis- EDIES, in this volume. 
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considering the cases cited by the defendant, the court states: 
". . . . nothing in any of those cases is authority for the 
proposition that a court may not render a contempt adjudi-
cation for failure to make support payments in a specific 
amount, even though smaller than those ordered, if the party 
did not have the ability to pay in full the amount ordered." 
If carried to its logical extreme the reasoning in this case 
practically eliminates the defense of inability in contempt 
proceedings. In a society which is both affluent and oriented 
in the direction of social welfare, it would be very difficult 
to find a father who would not be able to pay something. Must 
a father, faced with adversity and completely unable to pay 
the full amount required by the support order, be faced with 
the additional problem of second-guessing a court as to the 
amount he is "able" to pay? 
Civil Code section 139.7 provides: "An order for payment 
of an allowance for the support of one of the parties pursuant 
to Section 139 shall terminate at the end of the period specified 
in the order and shall not be extended unless the court in its 
original order retains jurisdiction." 
What is the meaning of "original order"? The only log-
ical answer is that given by the court in Maben v. Superior 
Court. 2 In its original order the trial court ordered the de-
fendant to pay the plaintiff $600 per month as alimony and 
this was subsequently reduced to $485 per month. There-
after, on the defendant's order to show cause, the court modi-
fied the prior support order as follows: "Defendant is ordered 
to pay to plaintiff for her support and maintenance for 12 
months $250 a month commencing January 1, 1966, and 
continuing for 11 months thereafter at which time alimony 
shall terminate." The husband fully complied with the provi-
sions of this order. All orders were silent as to continuing 
jurisdiction to modify. On January 13, 1967 (after full com-
pliance by the defendant husband with the last order of the 
court ordering payment for support and maintenance for 12 
months) the wife obtained an order requiring defendant to 
2. 255 Cal. App.2d 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
439 (1967). 
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show cause why he should not be required to pay $600 per 
month as alimony in the future. The husband moved to dis-
miss on the grounds that the court no longer had any jurisdic-
tion to grant the relief sought. 
Upon denial of the defendant's motion and upon setting 
of the order to show cause, the husband filed his petition for 
writ of prohibition. The appellate court looked to the digest 
of the bill by which section 139.7 was adopted which read, 
". . . . termination of alimony payments. Adds section 
13 9.7, Civ. C. Provides that alimony payments shall termi-
nate as provided in the order for support of the party unless 
that order provides for their extension." The legislative intent 
is clear and, as applied to the instant case, the statutory lan-
guage referred to the last order made by the court for limited 
alimony. Obviously the court had jurisdiction to modify the 
earlier orders which provided for payments for an indefinite 
period of time; it did not retain any jurisdiction to modify 
the last order after the expiration of the time limited therein 
for payment. As the court phrased it, ". . . . the legisla-
ture intended to provide that the obligation of one party to 
pay for the support of the other party pursuant to section 139 
shall terminate at the end of the period specified in the latest 
order and shall not be extended unless the court in that order 
expressly retains jurisdiction." 
Paternity and the Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy 
At common law, a child born to a married woman was 
legitimate unless there was evidence to show that the husband 
was: 
1. Incompetent. 2. Entirely absent, so as to have no 
intercourse or communication of any kind with the 
mother. 3. Entirely absent, at the period during which 
the child must, in the course of nature, have been be-
gotten. 4. Only present under circumstances as afford 
clear and satisfactory proof that there was no sexual 
intercourse. S 
3. Hargrave v. Hargrave, 9 Beaver 
552, 50 Eng. Rpt. at 458 (1846). 
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California Evidence Code, section 621 4 provides: "Not-
withstanding all other provisions of law, the issue of a wife, 
cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent, is con-
clusively presumed to be legitimate." 
The California statute includes the first two common-law 
tenets, though "incompetent" has been changed to "impotent" 
and the "cohabitating" is used to incorporate the second. 
A number of cases, beginning with Estate of McNamara,5 
follow the third common-law tenet to create an exception to 
the statute. In McNamara a wife deserted her husband and 
lived continuously thereafter with another man. 304 days 
after her change of partners she gave birth to a son whom 
nobody, including the court, regarded as her husband's child. 
McNamara stated the rule: ". the conclusive pre-
sumption must be limited to cases where the husband has 
had intercourse with the wife during the normal period of 
conception."6 Therefore, as at common law, the conclusive 
presumption does not apply unless conception occurs during 
cohabitation. 
The common-law rule of the conclusive presumption of 
legitimacy has been followed without exception. The statute, 
modified by the McNamara doctrine, has also been followed, 
although two apparent judicial exceptions exist. A medically 
sterile husband escaped the conclusive presumption of the 
paternity of his wife's child in Hughes v. Hughes7 by a process 
of reasoning which essentially equated sterility with impo-
tency.s The 1967 case of Jackson v. Jackson9 opens one 
avenue leading to possible avoidance of the conclusive pre-
sumption, based on blood test evidence, despite previous legis-
4. Cal. Stats. 1965, Ch. 299. For-
merly Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. § 1962, 
subd. (5). 
5. 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552, 7 A.L.R. 
313 (1919). 
6. 181 Cal. at 95, 183 P. at 557, 7 
A.L.R. at 322. 
7. 125 Cal. App.2d 781, 271 P.2d 
172 (1954). 
364 CAL LAW 1969 
8. When the statute was enacted, 
medical operations to produce sterility 
were virtually unknown, the concept 
hardly recognized. The common law 
"incompetent" simply meant lack of 
ability to procreate. The Hughes case 
follows the common law. 
9. 67 Cal.2d 245, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649, 
430 P.2d 289 (1967). 
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lative action,lO and an affirming judicial decision,tl which 
refused to alter the statute to include results of blood tests. 
In Jackson, the husband was permitted to introduce blood 
tests indicating his non-paternity of the child only in order 
to introduce further evidence to place himself within the 
McNamara rule.12 The Jackson case creates an exception to 
the statute only if the husband can account for all his wife's 
time. 
Neither the common law nor the statute relieves the husband 
of the effect of the conclusive presumption if his wife has 
intercourse with another man and conception occurs during 
marital cohabitation. That the husband may not be the 
biological father is totally immaterial. This was made clear 
in the first cases to apply the statute and is dramatically 
illustrated in the recent case of Hess v. Whitsett. 14 In this 
case, it was clear that Luther Whitsett, a Negro, was the natural 
father of Kathy Hess, a child described by the court as having 
"chocolate colored skin." The child's mother, a Caucasian, 
admitted having intercourse with Whitsett over a two-month 
period during which time she was cohabitating with her hus-
band, also a Caucasian. Regardless of these facts, the statute 
clearly applied: the husband was neither impotent, absent, 
10. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 890-896, 
formerly Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. §§ 
1980.1-1980.7, is the California version 
of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to 
Determine Paternity. When the statute 
was enacted, the legislature specifically 
excluded section 5 of the Uniform Act 
which provides: "The presumption of 
legitimacy of a child born during wed-
lock is overcome if the court finds that 
the conclusions of all the experts, as 
disclosed by the evidence based upon 
the tests, show that the husband is not 
the father of the child." 
11. Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal.2d 603, 
7 Cal. Rptr. 129, 354 P.2d 657 (1960). 
12. This he did by showing that the 
couple cohabitated less than four days, 
that they were together continuously 
during that time, and therefore, as 
shown by the blood tests, conception 
could not possibly have occurred during 
cohabitation. 
13. In Estate of Mills, 137 Cal. 298, 
70 P. 91 (1902), Diana and Roland 
Chatham cohabitated, i.e., lived to-
gether as husband and wife within the 
same household, and as a "normal" 
family, with one exception. After 1862, 
Roland never had intercourse with his 
wife; she never had intercourse with 
anyone but the family boarder, Robert 
Mills, whose bed and bedroom she 
shared. Nevertheless, the two chil-
dren born after 1862 were held to be 
legitimate children of the husband, and 
denied any share of the Mills estate. 
14. 257 Cal. App.2d 552, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 45 (1967). 
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nor practicing abstinence; therefore he was Kathy's legal father 
and she his legitimate daughter. 
A major problem confronting the court in Hess was the 
statement in McNamara that the conclusive presumption was 
subject to a "racial difference" exception.15 The court, point-
ing out that the language was dictum, concluded, "The doc-
trine of stare decisis does not apply to dictum ( and) 
there is no sound basis for the judicial creation of a 
racial difference exception.,,16 
The effect of the conclusive presumption is to make it 
impossible to show that a child who is conceived by a married 
woman while the latter is cohabitating with her husband is 
illegitimate. Evidence Code section 621, modified only by 
judicial acceptance of the limitations contained in the common-
law rule on which it is based, has been once again reinforced. 
Legitimation and Adoption 
The ease with which legitimation of an illegitimate child 
can be accomplished by adoptionI7 is emphasized by the 
recent case of Estate of Maxey.Is Bill Maxey and Nettie 
Hunt met in 1935, and their son, Harry, was born a year 
15. 181 Cal. at 96, 183 P. at 557-
558, 7 A.L.R. at 323: "There is one 
class of cases where it is recognized, 
in this country at least, that the husband 
is not to be taken as the father of the 
child, even though he had intercourse 
with his wife during the normal period 
of conception. That instance is where 
the husband and wife are of the same 
race, as for instance white, and it ap-
pears that the wife has had intercourse 
with a man of another race, as for in-
stance a Negro, and the child is of 
mixed blood. (Citations.) The reason 
why the conclusive presumption is not 
applied in such instances is that the ele-
ment of indeterminability which is the 
reason for the presumption in the ordi-
nary case is absent. It is clear that the 
husband is not the father. The actual 
366 CAL LAW 1969 
fact, in other words, is capable of def-
inite determination, and for this reason 
the conclusive presumption which is a 
substitute for such determination is not 
properly applicable." 
16. 257 Cal. App.2d at 556, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. at 48. 
17. Cal. Civ. Code § 230: Adoption 
of illegitimate child. The father of an 
illegitimate child, by publicly acknowl-
edging it as his own, receiving it as 
such, with the consent of his wife, 
if he is married, into his family, and 
otherwise treating it as if it were a 
legitimate child, thereby adopts it as 
such; and such child is thereupon 
deemed for all purposes legitimate from 
the time of its birth. 
18. 257 Cal. App.2d 391, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 837 (1967). 
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later. Nettie refused to marry Bill, but listed his name on 
the birth certificate. It was not clear when Harry took the 
Maxey name, but Bill acknowledged the child as his own in 
Oklahoma and later in California after the parties had married 
others and had moved to this state. Bill visited Harry about 
every six months for several years, once asked that Harry 
be permitted to spend the summer at the Maxey home (per-
mission was refused), and on another occasion addressed 
Harry as "son." Upon Bill's death the court ruled that Harry 
was entitled to letters of administration in preference to Bill's 
former "wife," his brothers or sisters, or the public admin-
istrator because he was a legitimate child within the meaning 
of Civil Code section 230. 
Perhaps there was further contact between father and son, 
perhaps Bill Maxey contributed to Harry's support, perhaps 
he made more than the token efforts toward Harry's upbringing 
apparent from the opinion. Probably not. Nevertheless, 
Harry was a legitimate child, fully entitled to all rights thereof. 
Problems in the area of adoption received attention from 
both the legislature and the courts in 1968. Subsection (b) 
was added to Civil Code section 222, providing: "If the 
court is satisfied that the adoption of a child by a stepparent 
is in the best interest of the parties and is in the public interest, 
it may approve such an adoption without regard to the ages 
of the child and such adoptive stepparent. "19 
Literally construed, this section could result in children of 
earlier marriages being adopted by subsequent spouses younger 
than the children! 
Civil Code section 232.520 was added in 1965 to liberalize 
existing custody rules granting preferential treatment to nat-
ural parents over third parties. In the first case to consider 
this section, Adoption of Neal/ the child had been left with 
an aunt and uncle for several years. The natural father had 
failed to communicate with the child for over six months 
19. Cal. Stats. 1968, Ch. 568, p. 365. 
20. Section 232.5: Cal. Stats. 1965, 
Ch. 1064. "The provisions of this chap-
ter shall be liberally construed to serve 
and protect the interests and welfare 
of the child." 
1. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
300 (1968). 
CAL LAW 1969 367 
21
Sammis: Community Property
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Community Property and Family Law 
and had made only token payments toward his support. In 
reversing the decision of the lower court denying the petition 
of the aunt and uncle in an abandonment proceeding to have 
the child declared free of parental custody, the appellate court 
pointed out that upon a new hearing of the petition the provi-
sions of Civil Code section 232.5 must be liberally applied. 
The rule prior to the adoption of that section limiting the 
inquiry solely to whether the child had been abandoned with-
in the meaning of section 701 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code [the predecessor of Civil Code section 232] is no longer 
law, and the making of a wise selection between the natural 
parent and a third party is now a duty imposed upon the court. 
Artificial Insemination 
Artificial insemination is the medical process which enables 
a couple, otherwise unable to have children, to achieve preg-
nancy by means of a surgical injection of the wife with semen 
obtained from a third party donor. This procedure has 
caused complicated legal problems until recently. 
In the first case to raise the issue, the courts were so startled 
and hostile to the new concept that they called it "adultery." 
Unanswerable questions resulted. If it was adultery by the 
woman-the donee-would· it not also be adultery on the 
part of the donor? If so, when? If at the time of the dona-
tion, what if the semen was never used? If at the time of 
injection, and the donor had died (semen so collected is often 
frozen for use at a later date) the donee would not only be 
guilty of adultery but also necrophilia. Perhaps the doctor, 
rather than the donor, should be the adulterer? If the doctor 
were a woman, the result would be a child conceived by two 
females. Absolve both the donor and the doctor from adul-
terous guilt? Then the woman would commit unilateral adul-
tery, or if she injected the semen herself, self-adultery! 
By the time the matter had reached the appellate court 
level, no reference was made to "adultery," but the decisions 
(all from an intermediate New York appellate court) were 
confused and conflicting. Allowing the husband visitation 
368 CAL LAW 1969 
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rights, one case2 held the child conceived by artificial insemi-
nation not illegitimate because ". . . . the child has been 
potentially adopted or semi-adopted."3 A later case4 found 
the child "not the legitimate issue of the husband"5 but never-
theless ordered him to support the child because his consent 
in writing to the artificial insemination constituted an implied 
contract to do so. 
People v. Sorenson,s a unanimous decision by the California 
supreme court, is the first logical and comprehensive judicial 
comment on the matter. When Lois and Folmer Sorenson 
were divorced, Lois declared she wanted no support award 
for their son, Christopher, who was conceived by artificial 
insemination to which Folmer had consented in writing. The 
court ordered no support payments but retained jurisdiction 
in the matter. When Lois later became too ill to work, she 
applied to the Sonoma County Welfare Department, which 
provided assistance but requested Folmer to contribute to 
Christopher's support. He refused and was convicted of will-
ful failure to provide for a minor child in violation of Cali-
fornia Penal Code section 270. In affirming that decision, 
Justice McComb, writing for the court, reasoned that: "(If) 
. . . . a husband who, unable to accomplish his objective 
of creating a child by using his own semen, purchases semen 
from a donor and uses it to inseminate his wife . . . proof 
of paternity has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.,,7 
Since the only issue before the court in Sorenson was the 
matter of child support, no determination was made on legit-
imacy, but the court left no doubt that it would rule in favor 
of legitimacy when the opportunity arises. 
The legislature took only a few weeks following Sorenson 
to add to Civil Code section 196b: 8 "The husband of a woman 
2. Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Mise 786,78 
N.Y.S.2d 390 (1948). 
3. 190 Misc. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 
391. 
4. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d 
1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1963). 
5. 39 Misc.2d at 1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d 
at 411. 
24 
6. 68 Cal.2d 280, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 
437 P.2d 495 (1968). For further dis-
cussion of this case, see Collings, CRIM-
INAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, in this vo1-
ume. 
7. 68 Cal.2d at 286, 66 Cal. Rptr. 
at 12,437 P.2d at 500. 
S. Cal. Stats. 1968, Ch. 235, p. 5. 
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who bears a child as a result of artificial insemination shall 
be liable for support of the child in the same manner as if 
he were the natural father, if he consented in writing to the 
artificial insemination." 
Additional legislation is necessary because courts cannot 
formulate details and regulations concerning a medical tech-
nique which is constantly growing more popular. A suggested 
model might be similar to a 1967 Oklahoma statute,9 the 
only comprehensive legislation passed to date. Combining 
regulations well established by the medical profession with 
existing adoption laws, the Oklahoma statute specifically 
makes the child conceived by artificial insemination the legit-
imate child of the husband consenting to the use of the process. 
The husband, the wife, and the physician must all sign the 
documents, and they must be approved by "the judge having 
jurisdiction over adoption of children." (The last phrase 
makes it clear that payment of legal fees will be required of 
couples wishing to use the technique.) 
Hopefully, similar legislation can be enacted in California 
to end such legal confusion and conflict over artificial insemi-
9. Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, nique of heterologous artificial insemi-
Title 10 §§ 551-553: nation unless currently licensed to prac-
§ 551. Authorization 
The technique of heterologous arti-
ficial insemination may be performed 
in this State by persons duly authorized 
to practice medicine at the request and 
with the consent in writing of the hus-
band and wife desiring the utilization 
of such technique for the purpose of 
conceiving a child or children. Laws 
1967, c. 305, § 1. 
Ii 552. Status of child 
Any child or children born as the 
result thereof shall be considered at law 
in all respects the same as a naturally 
conceived legitimate child of the hus-
band and wife so requesting and con-
senting to the use of such technique. 
Laws 1967, c. 305, § 2. 
§ 553. Persons authorized-Consent 
No person shall perform the tech-
370 CAL LAW 1969 
tice medicine in this State, and then 
only at the request and with the writ-
ten consent of the husband and wife 
desiring the utilization of such tech-
nique. The said consent shall be ex-
ecuted and acknowledged by both the 
husband and wife and the person who 
is to perform the technique, and the 
judge having jurisdiction over adoption 
of children, and an original thereof shall 
be filed under the same rules as adop-
tion papers. The written consent so 
filed shall not be open to the general 
public, and the information contained 
therein may be released only to the per-
sons executing such consent, or to per-
sons having a legitimate interest therein 
as evidenced by a specific court order. 
Laws 1967, c. 305, § 3. 
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nation as still remains after Sorenson. Until it is, Sorenson 
has at least served to clarify two previously unanswered prob-
lems: the identity of the father of a child conceived by artifi-
cial insemination, and his resulting financial responsibility for 
the child. 
* 
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